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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is the result of several years interest 
in the question of abortion. Heretofore, I have written 
letters to the editor of a newspaper, to the editor of 
MacLean's, and to the Chairman of the House of Commons 
Standing Committee on Health and Welfare in its study of 
Bills C-122, C-123, and C-I36, which were concerned with 
contraception and abortion. To write a thesis on the sub-
ject is my chance to come to a broader understanding of the 
problem. From my readings, I have found these outstanding 
features: 
1. Discrepancies in abortion statistics:- The 
discrepancies are to be found in the statistics of illegal 
and usually hidden abortions and in legal abortions. 
Actually, there can never be an accurate record of 
illegal abortions and one can hardly expect this to be kept, 
simply because of their clandestine nature. Estimates may 
vary tremendously, and one hardly knows whether they include 
spontaneous miscarriages as well as induced abortions. Some-
where between 100,000 and 300,000 abortions in Canada per 
year has been recorded. One could safely guess that at 
MacLean's June, 1963 edition. Letter to the Standing 
Committee on Health and Welfare is published in the Minutes, 
p. 632. See next footnote for details of the Committee. 
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least 40,000 are accomplished per year because that is the 
figure that the Dominion Bureau of Statistics has for the 
number of in-patients whose primary diagnosis is abortion. 
But that number will include spontaneous miscarriages as well 
as illegally induced abortions. Indeed, while fifty per cent 
of illegal abortions reported in police files are usually done 
by the injection into the womb of some septic fluid, very few 
of those 40,000 hospital cases in the D.B.S. file have septic 
causes associated with them. If the number of illegal abor-
tions Is in the range of tens of thousands, most are not re-
2 
suiting in hospital care. 
Therapeutic or legal abortions have been recorded in 
some hospitals, but under the pre-1969 law the records were 
never accumulated for federal statistics. Hence, we are in 
a quandry as to the number of legal hospital abortions pre-
vious to 1969. In terms relative to the 40,000 in-patients, 
they must be small; the Toronto General Hospital, the second 
largest hospital in Canada, averaged only 22 per year between 
1954 and I965.2 With the new law, every hospital planning to 
perform abortions must be accredited or approved and statis-
tics will be kept for examination of the minister of health 
in each province, and from these accurate statistics can be 
acquired for all of Canada. 
2 
Canada, Parliament, Commons, Standing Committee on 
Health and Welfare, Bill C-122, Bill C-123, Bill C-I36. 
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, House of Commons, 27th 
Parliament, 2nd sess., 1967- p. 19, 100,000 to 300,000 abor-
tions; p. 515, 40,000 hospital in-patients. 
3Ibid., p. 279. 
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2. The diversity of theological opinion:- It is 
rather strange to see the great diversity of opinion among 
Christian theologians on abortion. They can agree that 
modern genetics and embryology point to human growth as a 
smoothly developing process from conception, not a pattern 
with sharply defined stages. But they cannot agree on the 
beginning of its humanity. Nor can they agree on any other 
basis by which to consider abortion. Abortion has received 
a concerted examination by theologians and other professionals 
only once in recent years, at the International Conference on 
Abortion, held in Washington in 1967. And, at that Conference, 
only this amount of agreement was achieved: 
God is the creator of man and the author of life; man is 
created in the image of God; man is the steward of life 
and not its complete master. By inculcating an inclusive 
love of mankind, by teaching that life is the gift of 
God's providence, religion fosters a reverence for life 
and a respect for its sacredness which encourage at least 
an attitude of hesitancy toward the act of abortion.4 
3. A meagre amount of theological study on abortion:-
In the books and journals that I read on abortion, theological 
presentations were never lengthy. I read no book by an aca-
demic theologian that dealt exclusively with abortion; there 
was no thorough study by any theologian. The world awaits 
its first theological tomb on abortion. 
4. The dearth of counselling help for women with un-
wanted pregnancies:- Churches and secular institutions have 
^The Joseph P. Kennedy Foundation, The Terrible 
Choice: The Abortion Dilemma (New York: Bantam Books 
Inc., 1963), pp. 83-84. 
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little to offer the woman anxious about her pregnancy. There 
are homes for unwed mothers, but these are of no use to married 
women, and they receive the girls usually only after their 
third month of pregnancy, at a time when the girls have out-
lived their crisis and have decided whether to seek abortion 
or to carry on with the pregnancy. Since 1963, however, the 
situation has improved, with the establishment of "Birthright," 
a crisis counselling centre for women with unwanted pregnancies. 
With Birthright, help is as near as the telephone, and its 
success in Toronto has led to its recent expansion in Montreal 
and Edmonton, and in some cities in the United States. 
These four impressions stand out among many. The 
reader will note how negative they are; how, indeed, they 
point to the urgent need for study and action with regard to 
this serious problem. 
This paper attempts to answer the main question of the 
public debate: What should constitute legal grounds for abor-
tion? It is the central issue raised by the mass media and 
the central problem of the House of Commons Committee on 
Health and Welfare in its 1967-1963 hearings. Legal grounds, 
of course, concern legislatures and judges. Nevertheless, 
they have theological implications, namely, the value of the 
fetus and the right to abort it. They deserve the attention 
of Christian teaching. To this end I shall begin the dis-
cussion with attitudes and arguments that are prevalent in 
the public context. Then I shall work on the problem from 
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a specifically Christian theological context and try to sug-
gest a law that is theologically sound, and, hopefully, 
legally tenable. 
Before I begin, however, I would suggest that the 
central practical issue about abortion is not the grounds 
for making it legal but the means for reducing unwanted 
pregnancies. And while many may disagree with there being 
any law, few, if any, would say unwanted pregnancies are a 
good thing. The law will determine the conditions for legal 
abortions, it may affect the number of illegal abortions and 
the total number of abortions (e.g. a strict law will reduce 
legal and illegal abortions if positive factors like respect 
for fetal life and counselling agencies for women with un-
wanted pregnancies are available, too); but social and 
economic conditions and religious attitudes will play a 
greater role in determining the rate of unwanted pregnancies 
and abortions. From a Christian viewpoint, the best law will 
be that which reflects God's will regarding the value of the 
fetus and the right to abort it. Having done this, it will 
suggest guidelines that lead us closer to God's will in the 
abortion dilemma. 
My sources for the essay come from various books and 
journals, newspaper clippings, the 336 pages of Minutes and 
Proceedings of the House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Health and Welfare in its 1967-63 deliberations on abortion, 
as well as some conversations with persons at St. Monica House, 
a home for unwed mothers in Kitchener, and associations with 
Birthright. 
CHAPTER I 
ATTITUDES IN TRANSITION 
With respect to abortion, the psychological mood of 
the mass media has changed a great deal in the past ten 
years. Much more is being said openly. Newspapers report 
abortion procedures in foreign countries, especially in 
Britain and in the United States. Sweden used to be con-
sidered avante garde a few years ago because of its abortion 
laws, but with the heavy caseload of abortion-seekers under 
the 1967 British abortion law, it looks rather conservative 
today. Yet British statistics may soon decrease, at least 
in North American visitors, once New York, Hawaii, and Mary-
land start to practice their recently revised statutes and 
pregnant women avail themselves of abortion as they please, 
as long as the doctors are willing to perform the operation. 
We have seen in the newspapers articles about fee-splitting 
between American and British doctors. The American doctors 
send their patients to the British doctors who perform the 
operations, and then return them back to the American doctors 
for post-operation check-ups. We have read about "grand 
tours" for women who wish to combine a holiday trip in 
Europe after their abortion in England; and stories of London 
cabbies picking up girls at the airport and delivering them 
to abortion clinics. Pictures and stories about such girls 
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show little ugliness about the operation or discharge from 
the clinic. The girls are often surprised that the venture 
was so easy. The ugliness seems to come in the money-
grubbing. Guilt and suffering are born within. 
Ten years ago, abortion reformers had to face the re-
jection of the public. They were murder-lovers, butchers of 
innocent babes. Today, the sophisticated liberal speaks 
nonchalantly about the need for total repeal, and few persons 
react. It is interesting to note that while the Globe and 
Mail has been publishing an average of two items a week on 
abortion in the past two years, that there have been only a 
4 
few letters to the editor about abortion. The issue is, 
apparently, of little concern to most of its readers. 
Magazines have taken polls of readers to get their 
reactions to the abortion debate. In Photo-Journal, a Quebec-
based popular magazine, presumably with a majority of 
Catholic readers, a poll was held at the time of the House of 
Commons debates on abortion reform (Fall, 1967). At the same 
time, Good Housekeeping, an American-supported magazine with 
a reading public of various religious backgrounds held a simi-
lar poll. The two surveys compared closely on grounds for 
abortion except in the cases of the mother being unmarried 
or the family situation (income, etc.) being unsuitable for 
another child. In both cases the Quebec (Catholic?) maga-
zine showed a much more liberal attitude. 
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Photo Good 
Journal 
30.2$ 
73.3 
56.4 
32.2 
50.3 
Housekeeping 
34.1$ 
73.5 
15.5 
35.9 
14.6 
Mother's health threatened 
Unborn child's health 
threatened 
Unmarried mother 
Rape or incest 
Unsuitable time 
Though Good Housekeeping is most likely a married 
woman's magazine, the indication of married women only in 
the Photo-Journal was still 52.3$ for abortion if the mother 
was unmarried, and 43.3$ if the tim'e was unsuitable. Per-
haps we should not be surprised at this liberal attitude of 
Quebec "Catholic" women. Abortion is quite popular in South 
America too, where the population is predominantly "Catholic." 
And, Maryland, a traditionally Catholic state, is the second 
state in the United States to repeal abortion laws. 
On March 9, 1970, the Toronto Daily Star newspaper 
published a Gallop Poll on the following question: 
Would you favour or oppose a law which would permit 
a woman to go to a doctor to end pregnancy at any 
time during the first three months? 
U.S. Canada 
Favour 40$ 43$ 
Opposed 50$ 43$ 
Undecided 10$ 9$ 
100$ 100$ 
1Bill C-122, Bill C-123, Bill C-I36, pp. 764-772. 
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Canadians (and Americans) seem to be slightly more 
against abortion on demand than they are for it. But, 
according to the same article, earlier Gallup Polls had 
shown a strong favour (73$) of Canadians towards abortion 
when the health of the mother is in danger. 
If, as the Gallup Poll indicates, Canadian and 
American attitudes to abortion are very similar, then per-
haps the reasons behind the attitudes are similar. At any 
rate, Ralph B. Potter, Jr., has made some interesting ob-
servations of the American Protestant change in attitude 
toward abortion and I would suggest that they tell us a 
good deal about the attitudes of Canadian Protestants: 
The main elements of the abortion issue are not new; 
zeal for abortion reform is not new; most of the ar-
guments are not new. It is the receptivity of a broad 
segment of the "Protestant" public that is new. 
There are three factors LI could only see two from 
his writing] to this new receptivity. 
(a) A breakdown in old theological certainties about 
nature, God, and Man which sustained the conviction that 
nascent life in the womb is, in every circumstance, a 
gift from God given for the realization of mysterious 
purpose, and is, therefore, to be respected as inviolable 
from lawful human interference except in the tragic case 
in which the life of the fetus is pitted against the life 
of its mother. . . . Protestants have feared not an 
"abuse of nature" [as have Roman Catholics] but rather a 
direct affront to "nature's" God. When a new habit of 
mind now attributes new life to rotten luck in the prac-
tice of contraception rather than to purposeful will of 
a merciful God, neglect of the countermeasure of abor-
tion becomes irrational and superstitious retreat from 
the possibility of exercising control of one's destiny. 
Denial of accessibility to abortion comes to be seen by 
many as a violation of civic liberty. 
(b) There is a dimming of the vision of a Protestant 
American made to conform to the dictates of Protestant 
conscience. . . . By devotion to their own principles, 
i.e. self-determination and the rational control of 
nature, Protestants are obliged to tolerate a gap between 
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what is morally condemned and what is legally prescribed. 
Protestants are confused concerning the moral status of 
abortion when practiced by Christians. Their confusion 
is compounded by uncertainty regarding the extent to 
which the moral judgements of one segment of society should 
be imposed upon others by legal enactment. The unplea-
sant aftertaste of Prohibition [of alcohol] lingers on. 
More and more Protestants aquiesce to the moto You can't 
legislate morality."2 
To this analysis, I would like to make one adjustment 
--the fact that Prohibition was never practiced in Canada; 
and one addition--the growth of contextual or "situation" 
ethics. 
2 
Ralph B. Potter, Jr., "The Abortion Debate," in 
The Religious Situation, ed. by Donald R. Cutler (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 114-116. 
CHAPTER II 
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST GROUNDS FOR ABORTION 
A. Subjective Feeling 
Let us begin with positions that are held by 
Christians and non-Christians, positions that do not neces-
sarily reflect any religion. At the extreme "right" of the 
spectrum are those who assert the inalienable right to life 
of the fetus. Roman Catholics have expressed this, but so 
has a militant atheist I know. At the far "left" there is 
the position that abortions should b'e on demand; a position 
that secular humanists often hold and a position held by some 
Christian theologians (e.g., Joseph Fletcher: "No unwanted or 
unintended baby should ever be born"). And between the far 
right and the far left are opinions of all shades held by 
devout Christians and non-religionists alike. Why are persons 
of divergent religious beliefs able to agree on this matter, 
while vehemently disagreeing with some who share their reli-
gious attitudes? The answer, I think, lies in the fundamental 
inner feeling we have when we compare human life as an entity 
of value, with the usefulness of human life as an entity of 
value. The answer is conditioned by the weight we put on 
human life when compared with human suffering. I suspect 
that these attitudes are usually based on subjective feeling. 
Though we may argue with theological statements and make our 
Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics 
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arguments sound as though we are looking to the Bible, etc., 
as the source, the ultimate source may not be the Bible or 
any other theological source, but our subjective feeling. I 
suspect that much of the theological wrangling is caused by 
persons who start from a "gut" feeling and try to build 
arguments from theology to support this. If so, it is only 
natural that atheists and theists who have the same subjec-
tive feeling will agree with one another. 
B. The Humanity of the Fetus 
The humanity of the fetus is the most controversial 
aspect of abortion. If one believe-s that the fetus is 
actually human, then one is inclined to be hesitant in 
aborting it. Other things being equal, those who hold that 
the fetus is human from the time of conception have the 
2 
highest regard of all for the fetus. 
On the other hand, if one thinks of the fetus as less 
than human, one is going to be less concerned with the fetus 
being preserved and allowed to grow. Why should it have human 
rights if it is not human? Maybe there are instances in which 
the life of the fetus may rightly be aborted; instances in 
which values higher than its life are allowed primacy. The 
next question is, what is more valuable than that life, even 
though it is not human? This is the dilemma of those who 
2 
Popular Roman Catholic acceptance of abortion as men-
tioned on page 3 suggests the authority crisis in the Catholic 
Church and the greater taboo against contraception by the 
Church. 
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would abort the fetus. 
Is, then, the fetus human or not? Biologically, the 
fetus is incipient human life. From conception it has the 
genetic formation it will have if allowed to grow^to maturity. 
It is not a piece of tissue that has grown from the mother's 
womb. It is a genetic package sui generis formed by 23 
chromosomes of the father and 23 chromosomes of the mother 
and its relationship to the mother is one of apposition. 
Apposition does not imply the right of possession but only the 
right of first consideration regarding the fetus's effect on 
her body. Being so directly affected by the presence of the 
fetus, however, we should expect to do everything in our 
power to help her when the fetus is the cause of her distress. 
The trouble is that doctors can rid her of the fetus only by 
killing it in the process, unless, of course, the fetus has 
reached the age of "viability," or 26 weeks, at which time it 
may be able to survive outside the womb. Here again, there 
is still much difficulty because of the baby's vulnerability 
to disease and premature feeding abilities. If we we^e to 
choose a time best suited for the mother's health, we would 
choose some time before the end of the third month to perform 
an abortion, when the baby would have no chance of survival. 
Though knowledge of embryology points to the fetus as 
incipient human growth, neither medicine nor any other scien-
tific discipline can conclusively explain the point at which the 
fetus becomes or is fully human. They can say that the fetus is 
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not a horse or some other animal because its genetic package 
is human only. It is "human" in the sense that it is not 
some other living creature. Other than that, they, and 
persons of any other discipline are left fumbling for some 
definition to suit the purposes of their discipline. Theolo-
gians might define it as being fully human when it is the 
"image of God," but God alone knows that with certitude. The 
Criminal Code defines it for the purposes of law in Section 
195: 
A child becomes a human being within the meaning of the 
Criminal Code when it has completely proceeded in a 
living state from the body of its mother and whether or 
not it has breathed or has independent circulation or 
the navel string has been severed. 
So far, we have no universal definition for that point-
in human fetal life where we call the fetus a fully human being. 
Even if we could find one, there still must be agreement as to 
whether or not the right of the fetus to life is equal to its 
mother's right once the fetus has reached that point. Most 
persons assume that if the fetus- is human then it should be 
allowed the same rights as the mother, an equal opportunity 
to life. Others do not hold to this view because they do not 
equate the right to life with being human. They suggest that 
it is not the least common denominator (being human) that is 
the ultimate criterion for equal opportunity, but the differ-
ence in quality of life. These are not necessarily utilitarian 
qualities, such as value to the rest of the family; they can be 
inherent qualities such as maturity and intelligence. And bo 
those who would hold this position, the risk of health or 
position to the person (the mother) with these higher 
qualities is sometimes not worth preserving the life of 
the person (the fetus) with only the lower qualities of 
existence. 
There is still another argument that the anti-
abortionist might use: though the fetus cannot be proven 
to be fully human, the fact that it is incipient human life 
should be ranked higher than any qualitative differences. 
This argument is strengthened by the fact that all post-
natal life is given the right to life even though there are 
great differences in quality: some persons are like mere 
vegetables, while others are highly intelligent, etc. In 
answer to this argument an abortionist could reply that we 
must not just think of human life in terms of physical 
existence. The human qualities are cultural, non-animal, 
spiritual or aesthetic elements which go beyond mere 
existence, and in a case of conflict the barely human fetus 
should be aborted to prevent the thwarting of the highest 
qualities in the mother and others who may be affected. 
They explain that the reason mongoloid idiots, etc., are not 
killed or allowed to die is because they are never in a con-
flict of interest with other humans of such magnitude as an 
unwanted fetus might be. They may also argue that physical 
death is not to be abhorred so much as spiritual or psychic 
death or crippling. The termination of relatively insensate 
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embryonic life is sad, but the mother and family may be burden-
ed economically; if unwed, the mother's career might be inter-
rupted and her parents might be vindictive and unforgiving. 
In answer to this, the conserver of fetal life may 
reply, "But the suffering of mother and others can be healed 
in time, while the death of the fetus means that it has no 
further chance." But the objecter might respond, "Maybe the 
suffering will not be healed. Maybe the unwanted pregnancy 
is 'the straw that breaks the camel's back' and there is no 
recovery. Relationships could even get worse." 
The point is that one cannot solve the abortion 
problem by proving the fetus to be human or not human. Being 
convinced that the fetus should be kept alive and allowed to 
grow, and being convinced that fetal life is expendible in 
certain circumstances, are two axiomatic propositions. 
C. Ultimate Claim on the Fetus 
Another way of looking at the value of the fetus is 
not in terms of its humanity, but in terms of its value to 
other persons or God and asking who has ultimate claim upon 
it. All theologians would say that God has ultimate claim 
upon it. Some would say that though the fetus is not one of 
the creatures of the air, sea, or ground over which God gave 
him jurisdiction in Genesis 1:26-30, he does not warrant the 
same protection of life as does his mother. From this posi-
tion they might argue that God's authority has been delegated 
to man to the point that the value the fetus has to the mother 
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or to the father or to society is sufficient for man to decide 
concerning abortion in terms related to them. At any rate, 
by so arguing, they do so with the same point in view as the 
person who does not look to God for ultimate authority but 
uses these criteria as bases of judgement. 
D. Who Suffers the Most? 
Another important factor is one we have already touched 
on but have not discussed--the suffering involved. If the 
suffering the fetus undergoes could be measured on a scale 
and compared with the suffering of the mother, etc., this 
might be used by some as a criterion. The one who would suffer 
the most would perhaps have preeminent rights. Unfortunately, 
we cannot measure the suffering on either side. We can imagine 
the suffering of the mother, father, etc., but find it very 
difficult to imagine the suffering of the fetus because of un-
known factors like pain in its nervous system. I raise this 
"suffering" issue because I think that our imagination of the 
degree of suffering on both sides plays a large part in the 
feelings we have about abortion. Gynacologists generally dis-
like performing abortions perhaps because they think of the 
woman on the operating table as a clinical subject, but the 
fetus as a tiny human whose life they are to destroy. Those 
who do not perform the operation imagine the suffering from 
the strain and anxiety from the face and words of the mother, 
and the possible feelings of the fetus who they never see. I 
have sometimes gotten the impression from those who ask for 
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abortion on demand that women are unable to tolerate an un-
wanted pregnancy without frightful consequences. This view 
can be readily reinforced by conversations with some women 
carrying a child they do not want. For example, I inter-
viewed nine girls at St. Monica House, the home for unwed 
girls in Kitchener. All but two of them had seriously con-
templated abortion, and two nearly went through with it 
illegally. Some of the seven that had contemplated abortion 
were glad they had not, and the rest still wished that they 
had. Some were finding their pregnancies and the thought of 
having to bear an unwanted child distasteful enough that if 
they had the chance again they would seek an abortion. More-
over, they felt it should be available upon demand. This 
latter group felt that their suffering was not worth the 
life of the fetus. 
The "suffering" issue enters into the legal picture 
directly. The circumstances usually defined are: danger to 
the life of themselves (the mother); danger to her health, or 
certain aspects of her health such as physical, mental, social 
or economic. Other legal indications are statutory rape (when 
the girl is under age), incest, and fetal abnormalities. There 
may not be any suffering on the part of the girl or woman with 
statutory rape or incest, but if there is it could easily fall 
under the category of danger to her health. Fetal abnormal-
ities do not affect the woman's health directly, but in-
directly impose a burden upon her and the family. Some 
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argue that abortion of the abnormal fetus is doing the unborn 
child a favour, and this is an argument for a kind of mercy 
killing. 
I shall discuss these legal considerations in detail. 
CHAPTER III 
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ABORTION 
A. Danger to the Mother's Life 
This is sometimes qualified by such a phrase as 
"likely to endanger" or "there is a grave risk" since 
every pregnancy has the possibility of endangering the 
life of the mother. What is implied by these phrases is 
the doctor's judgement that ;if the fetus is not removed 
the mother will probably die. If the law of the land 
allows that only this circumstance makes abortion justi-
fiable, it assumes that the value of the fetus is higher 
than anything else save the physical life of the mother. 
B. Danger to the Health of the Mother 
In the Canadian and Japanese laws on abortion, 
"health" is stated with no qualification. In the Japanese 
situation "health" has been given such an interpretation 
that it has led to near abortion on demand. In 1966, for 
instance, there were 1,360,000 live births in Japan and a 
total of 303,216 abortions legally registered, of which 
305,075 were for the "protection of the mother's health." 
So far, the Canadian law has interpreted narrowly. Accord-
ing to Dr. George Maughan, chief gynacologist and obstetri-
1Bill C-122, Bill C-123, Bill C-136, p. 371. 
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cian at Montreal's Royal Victoria Hospital, physicians and 
surgeons remain conservative about abortion, but psychiatrists 
have adopted a much more liberal attitude. It is the gyna-
cologist who must perform the operation, he points out, 
2 
almost to his extreme distaste. Given willing doctors, 
however, the number of abortions depends upon the sensi-
tivities of the abortion committee of three or more doctors 
at each hospital, and upon the persuasive powers of those 
recommending the abortions to the committee. In Victoria 
Hospital, London, Ontario, the number of therapeutic abor-
tions have been 135 in 1969, 50 in 1968, and 26 in 1967-3 
I have learned from my own doctor that he would have no 
trouble whatever getting an abortion done at this hospital. 
The World Health Organization defines "health" as: 
a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-
being and not merely the absence of disease.4 
This definition is obviously a goal to reach, not a minimum 
standard. But if this was ever interpreted as the norm by 
which health should be judged, "health" could be used as 
the reason for abortion on demand. There is every reason 
to assume that on some abortion committees in Canada this 
2 
George Maughan, "Survey Indicates Rise in Hospital 
Abortions," Kitchener-Waterloo Record, (March 13, 1970), 
p. 27. 
^Martin Robinson, "Doctors Are Chided for Lack of 
Support of Birth Control," Kitchener-Waterloo Record 
(March 26, 1970), p. 42. 
^Bill C-122, Bill C-123, Bill C-136, p. 403. 
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interpretation will be approximated, provided, of course, that 
there are hospital beds to accommodate the women. 
I could speak in detail about each of the aspects of 
health—physical, mental, social and economic. For the sake 
of this theological paper, I shall speak only briefly. 
1. Physical 
Danger to physical health usually refers to such 
factors as fatigue and wear upon the mother, because of a 
pregnancy occurring too soon after the birth of a child, 
the hardship of pregnancy itself, extra burdens at home, 
physical problems like weak kidneys and heart, and general 
weakness. If the threat to physical health is sufficient it 
may reach the point of threat to her physical life. The 
degree of strain bearable is a medical judgement. 
2. Mental 
Danger to mental health, or psychiatric stress is the 
most commonly used indication for abortion in Canada. Threats 
of suicide and postpartum psychosis are typical indications. 
Depressions of various degrees are sufficient indication for 
abortion in the minds of some psychiatrists. Mild depression 
as an indication implies abortion on demand. Obviously, it 
is very difficult to assess the amount of mental stress a 
given woman could manage. And these psychiatric indications 
are made more difficult by the possibility of mental condi-
tions that may follow abortion and which sometimes do not 
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show themselves for years afterwards. At the present time 
the Canadian Psychiatric Association is conducting a five 
year study to gain further understanding about the problem. 
3. Social 
Social health is the well-being of the mother in soci 
relationships—with her parents, husband or boy friend, other 
children, and society as a whole. If the girl is unmarried 
or if the pregnancy results from adultery, the fear of social 
stigma may be worse or as bad as the actual condemnation that 
she and her husband/boy friend will have to put up with. In 
Japan, pregnancies out of wedlock are totally intolerable. 
Here in Canada, forgiveness and adoption of the baby are 
often possible. In many Canadian homes, however, social 
stigma would cause a great deal of stress and from real or 
imagined pressure many girls would seek abortion. Actually, 
social health can be understood as a form of mental health 
and may sometimes be included under that category. 
4. Economic 
Economic health is the financial well-being of the 
home in which the baby is to be reared. Poverty and large 
families often go hand-in-hand, not just because of the lack 
of contraception, but because of economic irresponsibility 
or hopelessness. Sociologist, Arturo Chacon, former General 
Secretary of the Methodist Church in Chile, recently told a 
group of United Church clergymen that the birth rate in 
South America would drop dramatically if the standard of 
living was raised for the urban and rural impoverished 
masses of that continent. Contraception is not the first 
answer for the South American masses. It will be used only 
as the poor see hope for a rise in living standards. The 
same could be said of the Indian and Metis poor in Canada. 
Certainly, one's views on abortion must be related to social 
indications for it. Until the social circumstances are 
improved abortions will always be widely sought. 
5. Ethical 
Ethical grounds for abortion fall under the category 
of "health of the mother," because they relate to the stress 
on the mother from criminal assault. Forced rape, however, 
is the only true assault on the mother. Statutory rape is 
fornication under age which is assumed to have been done by 
consent. Incest is also fornication by consent (otherwise 
the charge would be forced rape). It is interesting to find 
that adultery, another social crime, is rarely suggested as 
a possible ground for abortion. The reason, I suspect, is 
that the advocators of abortion for ethical reasons consider 
the matter in relation to whether or not the mother "deserves 
the pregnancy. In the case of rape and incest, there is a 
general feeling of pity and a demand for social redress. In 
the case of adultery, there is a greater feeling of righteous 
indignation—"She deserves what she got." Mrs. Louise 
Summerhill, the director of Birthright, a crisis centre for 
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women with unwanted pregnancies, tells me that the most dif-
ficult situations Birthright has to deal with are those re-
sulting from adultery. The guilt and lack of forgiveness in 
this situation seem to be the most distressing. 
C. Eugenic Indications 
These are not for the sake of the mother or family 
primarily, bint a type of mercy-killing to prevent unneces-
sary suffering of the baby after birth. The mother and 
family would be spared the trouble of looking after it or of 
giving it up to some retarded children's home, or the like. 
Having it aborted also prevents the trouble of society pro-
viding for it for the rest of its life. The severely subnormal 
child is looked upon as a human cripple, and by many as sub-
human, hardly able to feel or act in any human way and some-
times less sophisticatedly than a primitive animal. In sub-
sistent and primitive societies the severely subnormal child 
would in all likelihood be abandoned to die just as the sub-
normal animal would be left to die by its parents. Were food 
scarce enough in our society, no doubt such "useless" crea-
tures would be allowed to die too. 
Until very recently the detection of fetal abnormalities 
has been impossible. Predictions were made on the basis of 
statistics. Now we have medical procedures such as amniocentesis, 
whereby a hollow needle is inserted into the amniotic sac and 
amniotic fluid is withdrawn. Cells of the fetus found in the 
fluid can be analyzed so that diseases like RH incompatibil-
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ity, hemophilia, and Mongoloid Idiocy can be determined. 
Radiography can be used to tell harmful placement of the 
placenta, and electrocardiography can be used to tell fetal 
heart problems. Direct observation, then, is taking over from 
statistical guessing.5 Furthermore, RH incompatibility can 
now be prevented by intrauterine blood transfusions; and 
ruebella, a common fetal disease, may soon be prevented by 
vaccine. 
If abortion was legally permitted for eugenic situ-
ations, medicine might be dulled in its efforts to find 
further medical solutions and aids for the handicapped. 
Furthermore, there is no clear line of demarcation between 
who is or is not useless or undesirably incompetent, and on 
the grounds of even slight distortions, young lives could be 
destroyed. 
D. Over-Population 
A growing number of people favour abortion as a 
means of reducing over-population. The present Moderator 
of the United Church of Canada, Robert McLure, M.D., has 
performed many abortions on women in India and recommends 
it as a population reducer. It is not nearly as effective 
as raising the standards of living, as Arturo Chacon of 
Chile (page 23), and economist Lady Barbara Ward have sug-
gested. Lady Ward suggests that the reason poor families are 
Charles P. Kindregan, The Quality of Life (Milwaukee: 
The Bruce Publishing Co., 1963), pp. 34-35-
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so large in India is because poor farmers need as many sons 
as possible to look after them in their old age. Abortion 
as birth control is medically hazardous. In the Soviet bloc 
countries abortion has been legally permitted on a wide 
basis, but the medical hazards of abortion such as premature 
births in future pregnancies, miscarriages, and perforations 
of the uterus have been grave enough that two countries, 
Rumania and Bulgaria, have rescinded the permissive laws and 
made new ones that restrict abortion to threats to the life 
of the mother (Rumania), or pregnancy after three or more 
children, or old age.' 
It is interesting to note that not all countries 
suffer from exploding population. Some suffer from under-
population. Between the two World Wars, France regressed 
in population for reasons other than artificial birth control 
and Abortion. In Sweden, population was so small that it was 
not until 1939 that abortion was allowed to be legalized. 
This ends our discussion of atheological indications 
for abortion. As we shall see, and have seen in part already, 
they are not irrelevant to the thinking of clergymen and 
theologians. In reality, theologians are forced to consider 
them carefully if they are to make ethical judgements which 
have useful bearing on actual human situations. 
Data from a television programme. 
7 
C. Tietze and Sarah Lewit, "Abortion," Scientific 
American, CCXX (January, 1969). 
CHAPTER IV 
A SURVEY OF CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TO ABORTION 
A. The Right and the Left 
Theological arguments on abortion, like political 
views, can be divided into right and left positions. Start-
ing with the far right, we find those who believe that 
abortion is morally indefensible. From there the scale of 
permissible circumstances moves to threat to the life of the 
mother, serious threat to her physipal health, serious threat 
to her mental health; then into general physical health, mental 
health, social health or socioeconomic welfare. Ethical and 
eugenic reasons may come in anywhere after the threat to the 
life of the mother. Those who favour abortion as birth 
control ("on demand") represent the far left. Akin to this 
spectrum of morality is division of opinion regarding the legal 
right to make abortion laws. Usually associated with the 
rightist moral position is the belief that it is the proper 
function of the state to intervene in the matter of abortion 
and make laws to prevent harm to the mother, family, medical 
profession, and society at large. Those who tend toward 
abortion on demand would usually prefer safeguards only for 
the medical health of the mother. They may ask the question: 
"What reason can justify the refusal of the state to grant per-
mission for an abortion?" or the more radical question, "Why 
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should there be any law?" The right to legislate on abortion 
is a bigger issue in the United States than in Canada because 
of the attempt to separate Church and State by the Constitu-
tion of the United States. In Canada there is no legal de-
finition of the moral and spiritual powers in terms :of law. 
The problem in the United States is compounded by the fact 
that abortion laws come under state rather than federal 
jurisdiction. 
Ralph B. Potter, Jr., describes the right and left 
wing moral positions in the United States: 
The rub of the right-wing argument is simple and stark: 
the condoning of widespread abortion would undermine 
civilization. The argument is couched in theological 
terms; it leads, however, to conclusions in the realm 
of cultural anthropology. There are many distractive 
bypaths along the route to be traversed in argument. But 
the constant goal is to convince hearers by whatever ar-
guments carry force in their generation, that the prac-
tice of abortion is incompatible with the attainment of 
man's true humanity. 
The profundity of the right-wing argument is its 
greatest weakness. Many of the injuries described by 
controversialists on the right take place in a dimension 
of existence unknown or unexplained by their fellow 
citizens. Indeed, when the particular "harms" are 
analyzed closely, they are seen to consist ultimately 
of a deprivation of a greater good, a good which may 
transcend the concern of a secular, pluralistic state. 
Can the prevention of such harm, or the realization of 
such a good, be considered a valid legislative purpose 
sufficient to overrrule the strong desires of innumer-
able pregnant women? . . . (p. 123) 
Leftists emphasize the high incidence of criminal 
abortion. Rightists emphasize statistics to diminish 
the danger gap between hospital and extra-hospital 
abortions, (p. 124) 
Leftists say right wing propaganda encourages guilt in 
women over abortion. Rightists say psychiatrists don't 
pick up a lot of the inner anxiety on this. (p. 126) 
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Leftists would remove the cultural inducement to exhibit 
the learned response of guilt. Rightists insist that to 
get rid of guilt you must avoid the occasion for guilt. 
Absence of guilt in this case is a sign of callousness 
and spiritual sclerosis, (p. 126) 
Rightists claim that abortion frustrates the realiza-
tion of man's true humanity, though the evidence for 
this is hard to find. The central claim of the right 
wing is that abortion is evil because it deprives 
the mother of the greater good of becoming a mother. 
[I find this hard to believe and have found no evi-
dence elsewhere of such a claim.] (p. 127) 
Is the rejection of abortion rooted in the nature of 
man or does it derive from a response to the image of 
man portrayed in the Gospels? The issue cannot be 
settled by available anthropological data which seem 
to indicate a general ambivalence towards abortion with-
in societies which differ greatly in the rate of occur-
ance and the severity of sanctions imposed, (pp. 129-130) 
The right wing must indicate a harm the law cannot ignore 
to a victim the law is bound to protect. . . . To defend 
public laws against abortion the Christian needs legal 
arguments derived from the universal norms of natural 
justice, (pp. 131-132) 
Man's worth is not to be assessed according to what he 
has become through social intercourse or by an estimate 
of what he may yet become. Rather it is God's labor, 
his purpose, his economy, which places the price of life 
so high that no transient human value can serve as com-
pensation. But with the erosion of the theological 
foundations of the Christian view of man's alien dignity 
[i.e., dignity from outside], the barriers to abortion 
built on those foundations are crumbling in the hearts 
of individuals and the statutes of the states, (p. 150)1 
Distinguishing between right and left wings is largely 
a matter of emphasis. To the rightist, the value of the fetus 
has preeminent right over the other or others who may suffer 
from the unwanted pregnancy. To the leftist, the suffering 
Ralph B. Potter, Jr., Abortion Debate, pp. 23-50. 
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of the mother, family, etc., has preeminent right over the 
value of the fetus. Each side views the law for its purposes. 
The strict law helps the rightist. A permissive law or no 
law at all helps the leftist. 
Answering the question, "Who has ultimate claim 
upon the fetus?" is the way that many theologians evaluate 
the worth of the fetus vis-a-vis the suffering of others. 
Let us look at the answers given to this question from church 
denominations and from individual theologians. 
B. Who has Ultimate Claim upon the Fetus? 
No Christian would deny that God has ultimate claim 
upon the fetus, just as He has ultimate claim upon nature 
and the rest of humanity. As our Creator, as the Alpha and 
Omega of all that is, He has the last and foremost say. Nor 
would many—I know of none--say that the fetus is of the 
order of the swimming, crawling, and flying things over which 
man is to have dominion (Genesis I). Thus, if man has control 
over the life of the f,etus, it is in a relationship something 
akin to the relationship that he has to his fellow man—as a 
brother and neighbour. How close this "something" is, I have 
never heard defined, but as we shall see,it becomes the focus 
of the whole debate. The question is more than "Am I my 
brother's keeper?"; it is also, "How far is the fetus whom 
God has made to become a human my brother?" Is it possible 
that God does not assume direct responsibility of the fetus 
to himself alone? Is it possible that he delegates some of 
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his authority and the right to live or let'live upon man, upon 
for example, no man but the fetus himself, or upon the mother, 
or upon the father, or upon society as a whole? 
1. Denominational Positions 
(a) The Fetus is Under Claim to No One But Himself 
and God:- This is the answer of all those who claim the 
inalienable right of the fetus to live. The fetus has in-
trinsic worth and this prevents any one from claiming right 
over his life in terms of some other person or value. He is 
to be treated with the same fundamental rights given a born 
human being. As stated earlier, people of various religious 
views may hold this position, but it is held mainly by the 
Roman Catholic Church. It is a position of natural law, 
i.e. the fetus has the natural right to be allowed to live. 
The right is not handed to him for merit or position. He has 
it simply because he is incipient human life. Pope Pius XII 
explains it this way: 
Innocent human life, in whatever condition it is found, 
is to be secure from the very first moment of its exis-
tence from any direct deliberate attack. This is a 
fundamental right of the human person, which is of 
general value in the Christian concept of life; and 
hence as valid for the still hidden life within the 
womb of the mother as for the life of the already born 
and developing outside her. . . . Whatever foundation 
there may be for the distinction between these various 
phases of the development of life that is born, or still 
unborn, in profane and ecclesiastical law, and as regards 
certain civil and penal consequences, all these cases in-
volve a grave and unlawful attack upon the inviolability 
of human life.2 
"Abortion," The New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1962, I, 
29. 
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Notice the inseparateness of the four factors—human 
life, the intention of nature, fetal life, the right to live. 
There is no ambiguity or question about their direct relation-
ship with one another. 
It is interesting also how ironclad is the Catholic 
interpretation of the sin of abortion. It is a sin under 
canon law only if it results from all of the following 
factors: if it is intended, i.e. not an accident; if it 
happens from the deliberate use of means, i.e. not indirect-
ly; if the means are efficacious, i.e. the fetus dies. 
There is a great deal of confidence shown here in man's 
4 
ability to estimate what is and what is not sin; or what is 
the most important part of sin; and the ability to summarize 
and rank it in terms of propositions or statements. The 
danger is that casuistry, the skill of interpreting cons-
cience, becomes the focal point here--not the fetus, not the 
mother, not medicine, not the social and economic and spiri-
tual evils behind the suffering. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Catholic 
position is the belief that the right to life is jiot some-
thing for humanity to bestow upon the fetus, in law, or out 
of it, but something that is inherent in the "nature" of things. 
This separates the Catholics from those who say that God be-
stows the right directly, and from those who say that the 
state should be the ultimate judge in the matter.^ 
3Ibid., p. 30. 
See Appendix I for the factors involved in the tra-
ditional theological elements. 
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(b) The Fetus's Right to Life is Delegated to the 
Father:- There is only one clear reference to abortion 
in the Bible: Exodus 21:22-25: 
When men strive together, and hurt a woman with child, 
so that there is a miscarriage, and yet no harm follows, 
the one who hurt her shall be fined, according as the 
woman's husband shall lay upon him; and he shall pay as 
the judges determine. If any harm follows, then you 
shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, 
hand for hand, foot for foot . . . stripe for stripe. 
This passage is part of a larger passage concerned 
with acts of violence--Exodus 21:12-27. We see in this 
larger passage that parents are ranked higher than children 
(verse 17) and freemen higher than slaves (verse 21). Is 
4 
it any wonder, then, that the fetus is given less regard than 
his mother, as seen in the quotation above? However, it is 
the value that the fetus has to the father that ultimately 
counts. For in the case of "no harm done" (the mother does 
not suffer) the husband gets the money, and in the case of 
the death of the mother, the husband receives recompense 
again. In effect, both the mother and fetus are the prop-
erty of the husband and justice is done with the husband in 
mind. 
In Islamic law, the fetus is regarded as a possible 
heir who can have his own heirs, but abortion is performed 
only with the father's consent.-> In modern times, the 
father, as final arbiter in the matter, is not accepted by 
c 
Martin J. Buss, "The Beginning of Human Life as an 
Ethical Problem," The Journal of Religion, XLVII (July, 
1967), 246. 
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either Christians or Jews. The Jews, however, have made 
this Exodus passage their proof text and most Jewish the-
ologians regard the fetus's right to life incontestable 
except on the grounds of threat to the mother's life or 
health. 
(c) The Fetus's Right to Life is Determined by 
Strain on the Mother:- This is the most popular position of 
moderate and leftist Christian theologians and Churches. Among 
Protestant Canadian denominations we can see a gradual shift 
from relatively conservative or rightist positions to fairly 
liberal or leftist positions as we move from the Presbyterian 
to the Anglican to the United Churches. 
The Presbyterians recommend abortion "where the 
mother's physical and mental health are seriously threaten-
ed."' The Anglicans recommend abortion on the same grounds, 
i.e., where the pregnancy involves a "serious threat to the 
life or health of the expectant mother." The United 
Church of Canada officially recommends abortion "when con-
tinuance of pregnancy is likely to endanger the mother's 
life or seriously impair her physical or mental health," 
but the committee which presented this as part of a brief 
to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Health and 
David Granfield, The Abortion Decision (Garden City: 
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1969), pp. 47-49-
7Bill C-122, Bill C-123, Bill C-136, p. 392. 
3 
Ibid., p. 475-
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Welfare gave a more liberal view. One of the members, the 
Rev. J. Raymond Hord, presented a paper in which he said 
that the fetus was of accruing value." Two other members 
interpreted this to mean value accruing to the mother. 
In other words, the more the fetus meant to the mother, the 
more did its value increase. None of the United Church com-
mittee disagreed with this interpretation. 
2. Individual Theologians 
(a) The Fetus is Under Claim to No One But Himself 
and God:- Roman Catholic theologians usually hold to this 
view. Since Vatican II, however, more are speaking of moral 
questions being in the last analysis a question of conscience. 
If the mother believes that abortion is the moral thing for 
her, then she may regretfully seek an abortion. Richard A. 
McCormick, S.J., suggests that the fusion of the soul does 
not take place at conception, "but rather at some later point, 
perhaps when the body develops recognizeable human character-
istics. "The Catholic Church," he points out, "has never 
settled the theoretical question definitely; indeed, it is 
perhaps questionable if this is in her realm of competence." 
Father R. F. Drinan disagrees, because in the absence of cer-
tainty the presumption must be that the fetus is a human per-
son and because, even if the presumption is false the embryo 
9Ibid., p. 623. 
10Ibid., pp. 603, 610. 
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"constitutes the necessary material for the infusion of the 
soul."11 The Canadian Catholic bishops never referred to the 
infusion of soul theory in their statements to the House of 
Commons Standing Committee on Health and Welfare, but assumed 
the modern biological explanation of fetal development; i.e. 
a "continuing process in the child from the moment of concep-
12 tion to adult age." 
(b) The Fetus's Right to Life is Delegated to the 
Father:- To my knowledge, no theologian has interpreted 
the right of the fetus to live primarily on its meaning to 
the father. 
(c) The Fetus's Right to Life is Determined by 
Strain on the Mother:- Ronald M. Green holds to the posi-
tion of the late 19th Century philosopher W. D. Ross, that 
morality should be based on prima facie duty to that which 
one has promised. In pregnancy there is not "an absolute 
but a prima facie duty to respect the life of the fetus." 
Such a duty would constitute a moral claim that could 
be outweighed by more pressing obligations like the 
life of the mother, her health, eugenic reasons and 
rape. . . . Here the locus of ethical concern is not 
upon obligation to the life of the fetus but rather 
upon the act of faith-keeping or promise-keeping 
occasioned by the sexual act. . . . Whenever a woman 
willingly engages in coitus she, in doing so, makes 
an implicit promise that in the event of conception 
she will bear and give life to the fruit of her act 
Kennedy, The Terrible Choice, p. 36. 
12Bill C-122, Bill C-123, Bill C-136, p. 325. Andre 
Naud, Professor of Theology, University of Montreal. 
even if she has used contraception. . . . This puts the 
decision primarily on the mother, not on society as a 
whole, because promise to life is the issue, not life. 
Society should only require that the woman seek psychi-
atric help and advice.13 
I question this as a Christian position. It makes 
the life of the fetus a matter of paternalism (maternalism?) 
instead of value on its own—a very degrading position for 
the fetus. Nevertheless, in an age when honour and duty and 
responsibility for one's actions are being heeded less and 
less, it is a good reminder of responsibility to those who 
just want to "do their own thing" whatever the consequences. 
Another theologian who is of this category is Martin 
J. Buss, Professor of Theology at the Chicago School of 
Divinity. ^ Buss believes that humanity is a stage reached 
in the development of the embryo that can be discerned by 
characteristics that are peculiarily human. These are the 
characteristics of language. Language is the conditio sine 
qua non for humanity and the means by which the Word of God 
is transmitted to man. It is God's addressing the growing 
life that makes it valuable as a person, nothing intrinsic 
to itself or to any other person or value. But until the 
life has reached the stage where it can understand the langu-
age of man, it cannot understand the revelation of God. God 
-^ Ronald M. Green, "Abortion and Promise-Keeping," 
Christianity and Crisis, XXVII (May 15, 1967), portions 
from pp. 109-112. 
"^The description on page of the thesis is a sum-
mary of Dr. Buss's presentation. Buss, "Beginning of Human 
Life as an Ethical Problem," pp. 244-253. 
speaks his Word through persons and tradition. The fetus 
cannot understand Him and is therefore less than human and 
less important than other humans who may be suffering be-
cause of him. Some have pointed out that God cannot address 
the child in the womb and they may point to Jeremiah l:4f 
which declares that Jeremiah was "known" while still in the 
womb. But Buss is arguing that there is a dividing line 
between the human or language-understanding child and the 
prehuman. Though God could address Jeremiah as a prehuman, 
the image of God "can properly represent in man only that 
selfhood and mastery of its environment which makes him 
relate to and share in divine creativity" which begins at 
least at the cultural stage of life where man responds to 
man in meaningful language. 
Having established the beginnings of real humanity, 
Buss implies that any prehuman life can be aborted as a 
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means of birth control. J If questioned on the grounds 
for abortion he might restrict himself more than he does, 
but one gets the impression that he holds little concern 
for prenatal life. 
It would seem that the option of voluntary abortion 
is indicated by a genuine fusion of faith, creative 
reason, and love. . . . It is in line with biblical 
tradition not only because of the Bible's eloquent 
silence on the subject but even moreso because of the 
Judeo-Christian concern for personal relationships 
with deity and one's fellow man, which go beyond per-
sonal passivity and simple biological existence.1° 
15Ibid., p. 252. 
l6Ibid., p. 253-
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I see two flaws in his arguments: his identification of the 
"image" of God as a stage at least as advanced as the ability 
to respond culturally; and secondly, his attempt to demon-
strate the unimportance of prenatal life. The "image" of God 
does not necessarily begin at any particular stage past con-
ception. Since child baptism is often performed before the 
child understands language and yet child baptism implies 
God's prevenient grace, why use cultural or language develop-
ment as the beginning of the image of God in man? As for the 
worth of the fetus, I fail to see God having a radical dif-
ference in concern for the fetus in comparison with that he 
would have for the person who is culturally aware. 
(d) God Delegates His Authority to No One. He 
Assumes it Directly:- There are several theologians who 
look to God alone as the authority. They assume that the 
fetus is given by God and that he is human in God's sight 
and that he must be granted the same right to live as his 
mother. Thus, the only possible reason for abortion would 
be that case where the life of the mother was in jeopardy 
because of the fetus within her, and there was no likely 
way of saving her without aborting the fetus. In such a 
case, two equal lives in the sight of God must be given as 
good a chance as possible. If the fetus were under the age 
of viability, then the choice would be to save the mother. 
If, on the other hand, the fetus were of the age of viability, 
then the choice would involve other factors. This approach 
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is taken by Karl Barth, Helmut Thielicke, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 
Paul Ramsey and Graham Scott. 
In his Church Dogmatics III, 4, Barth explains his 
position on abortion: 
He who destroys germinating life kills a man and thus 
ventures the monstrous thing of decreeing concerning 
the life and death of a fellow man whose life Is given 
by God and therefore, like his own, belongs to Him. 
He desires to discharge a divine office, or, even if 
not, he accepts responsibility for such discharge by 
daring to have the last word on at least the temporal 
form of the life of his fellow-man. . . . This child 
is a man for whose life the Son of God has died, for 
whose unavoidable past in the guilt of all humanity and 
future individual guilt He has already paid the price. 
(p. 416) 
How can they [the parents] will the opposite [the death 
of the fetus]? They can do so only on the presupposition 
of their own blindness to life, in bondage to the opinion 
that they must live rather than they may live, and there-
fore out of anxiety, i.e. out of gracelessness and there-
fore godlessness. (p. 420) 
Human life is not something enforced but permitted; 
i.e., it is freedom and grace, (p. 413) 
In his grace God can will to preserve the life which 
He has given', and in His grace He can will to take it 
again. Either way, it is not lost before Him. Men 
cannot exercise the same sovereignty in relation to 
it. . . . Trained in the freedom which derives from 
the grace of God, they can choose and will only one 
thing—they can desire only its life and healthy 
birth. . . . In the sense of a guiding line the one 
exception is the balance of one life against the 
other. . . .[in which case] the calculation and ven-
ture must take place before God and in responsibility 
to Him. (p. 422)17 
Up to this point, Barth has been adamant in his res-
trictions. In his small print, however, he mentions an ex-
'Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, III, 4 (Edinborough: 
T. and T. Clark Publishers, 1961). 
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ception which, in my mind, has a withering effect on the 
strength of his presentation. He states: 
It does not follow, however, that any doctor is 
generally and radically guilty of transgressing the 
command of God, though he may expose himself to legal 
penalty, if he thinks he should urge a socio-medical 
indication". . . . For occasionally the command of 
God may impose a judgement and action which go beyond 
what is sanctioned by the law.18 
Why Barth should be suddenly interested in the socio-
medical indication in terms of human law is not clear. Of 
course, God can order something that is against human law! 
But why should He order a command that goes against His own 
law? Barth has just finished driving home the sinfulness of 
4 
abortion for any reason but the life of the mother. Why does 
he now say that a socio-medical reason may be permissible? 
Why didn't he say near the beginning, as he now says in this 
small print, that the will of God is something we never fully 
understand, but as a general rule we should permit abortion 
only in the case of a threat to the mother's life? With 
this footnote I am left with a confused opinion. I do not 
know how convinced he is about abortion because I do not know 
how often he thinks the doctors can urge abortion for a socio-
medical indication. 
Helmut Thielicke is more consistent than Barth in his 
ethics on abortion. He follows the same line of reasoning 
about fetal value being dependent on the gift of God in his 
book, The Ethics of Sex. 
13 
Ibid., p. 422, small print. 
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In pregnancy it is not a question—as it is in the 
case of contraception—whether a proffered gift can 
be responsibly accepted, but rather whether an already 
bestowed gift can be spurned, whether one dares to 
brush aside the arm of God after this arm has already 
been outstretched. (p. 227)19 
We are in the realm of God's gifts and God's res-
ponsibility and God's judgement and concern. Therefore we 
look upon the fetus and abortion in the context of tragedy 
and judgement upon the whole of society as well as on the 
mother: 
The judgement pronounced by the Christian message goes 
beyond the conception of guilt implied by the penal 
sentence in several respects: 
1. In the sense that it radicalizes the law. The murder 
does not begin with the active killing (Matt. 5:21ff), nor 
in the killing of the embryo. It begins rather with the 
renunciation of the embryo; for here Is a person who refuses 
to say "Yes" to a gift bestowed by God and a responsibil-
ity imposed by him. (p. 227) 
2. The legal concept of guilt transcended by the spiritual 
conception that the divine judgement is more merciful than 
the judgement of men. One sees the guilt of the individual 
incorporated in a totality of guilt. He turns to others, 
asking which of them dares to cast the first stone (John 
3:7). The total guilt can include the socio-economic 
situation and would imply a change in the social conditions 
in this case. . . yet there is no discernable reason that 
can justify social situations for abortions, including 
overpopulation, (pp. 229,230)20 
The worth of the fetus stems from the order of creation and 
the order of redemption. From the order of creation we have 
the growth of the fetus as a miracle actualizing itself. From 
Helmut Thielicke. The Ethics of Sex (New York: Harper 
and Row Publishers, 1964). The numbers in brackets at end of 
quoted paragraphs refer to the page numbers in the book. 
20T, . . Ibid. 
the order of redemption we have the Christ buying him with 
a price and bestowing upon him an "alien dignity." 
This alien dignity expresses the fact that it is not 
man's own worth—his value for producing "good works," 
his functional proficiency, his pragmatic utility— 
that gives him his dignity, but rather what God has 
"spent on him," the sacrificial love which God has in-
vested in him (Deut. 7:7ff). . . - And this actualiza-
tion of man's alien dignity which we have emphasized, 
may well exist at that point where man is still a fetus 
and has no Important pragmatic value or may even be re-
garded as a burdensome, disturbing "enemy" (unjust 
aggressor), (p. 231)21-
He then compares the Reformation concept of the 
orders of creation with that of Catholicism, showing that 
his reasoning is not based on Catholic presuppositions. 
The Catholic orders of creation presuppose that the Fall 
represents only an accidental break in the structure of 
order of creation. . . . One can almost pass over the 
Fall. . . . Reformation doctrine says that other than 
the order of marriage and family which are orders of 
creation, the orders are orders for God to preserve the 
fallen world. [As for abortion] . . . the conflict be-
tween life and life does not occur in the original order 
of creation and therefore the order of creation cannot 
provide an answer to the question—whose life, the 
mother or the fetus's? (p. 236) 
Thielicke claims that we cannot find the answer in tradi-
tion, but only in the Christ-centred conscience. The mother 
can volunteer to sacrifice herself or she can ask for mercy 
on the grounds of quantitative differences. 
Caught in the agony of the Fall, we are left to make 
decisions on this one possibility of abortion in which we 
know we will sin no matter what we do. How different this 
explanation is from the confident-sounding casuistry of 
Ibid. 
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Catholic canon law in which direct abortion is worse than 
both lives dying, simply because the former is against canon 
law while the latter is not. Thielicke says, "In either case 
we cannot decide with strict theological clarity and what-
ever, we can decide only subject to forgiveness." (p. 245) 
The freedom with respect to the medical indication 
[life of mother] in pregnancy should be understood 
as costly and not as cheap freedom. Only from this 
point of view can the quantitative criterion enter 
into consideration. And even there it enters only when 
the elemental conflict between the life of the mother 
and that of the unborn child permits—and not only per-
mits, but then also demands—that a decision be made.22 
(p. 247) 
One who is even more fixed in his mind than Barth 
or Thielicke is Dietrich Bonhoeffer'. Abortion to him is 
anathema under all circumstances. "The question whether 
the life of the mother or the life of the child is of greater 
value can hardly be a matter for a human decision." ' He also 
says that "in cases where it is an act of despair, performed 
in circumstances of extreme human or economic destitution and 
misery, the guilt may often lie rather with the community than 
with the individual." ^  I suggest that if he is really con-
cerned with community responsibility, he should be just as 
concerned that at least one of the two lives be prevented 
from dying. 
22 
Ibid. 
23 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics (Glasgow: Fontana 
Library, 1963), p. 176. 
24Ibid., p. 176. 
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Also included in our list of anti-abortionists is 
the well-known American ethicist, Paul Ramsey. From what I 
have read of his writings, I see nothing new to add to the 
ideas of the three Continental theologians we have just re-
viewed. I do see, however, a different flavor. Paul Ramsay 
uses scriptural quotes more freely than the Continental 
theologians and with them he creates the mood of compassion 
and loving kindness that God has for man, a mood which implies 
that the fetus must be very important to him also. 
The value of human life is ultimately grounded in the 
value God is placing on it. Man is sacredness in human 
biological processes no less than his is a sacredness 
in the human social or political order. That sacredness 
consists not in its heart to anybody. What life is in 
and of itself is most clearly to be seen in situations 
of naked equality of one life with another, and in the 
situation of congeneric helplessness which is the human 
condition in the first of life. . . . It is best not to 
concentrate on degrees of relative worth we may later 
acquire, (p. 72) 
The Lord did not set his love upon you, nor choose you, 
because you were already intrinsically more than a blob 
of tissue in the uterus or greater in size than the period 
at the end of this sentence; "but it is because the Lord 
loves you, and is keeping the oath which he swore to your 
fathers, that the Lord has brought you out with a mighty 
hand. . . . " (Deut. 7:3) RSV 
Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, and before 
you were born I consecrated you. . . . (Jeremiah 1:5) RSV 
0 God, You know me inside and out, through and through. 
Your circumventing presence covers my every move . . . 
You were present at my very conception. 
You guided the development of my unformed members within 
the body of my mother. Nothing about me, from beginning 
to end, was hid from Your eyes. 
How frightfully and fantastically wonderful it all is! 
--Psalm 139:1,5, 12b, 13, 14. 
Good Lord, Where Are You? 
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Thus, every human being is a unique unrepeatable oppor-
tunity to praise God. His life is entirely an ordination, 
a loan, and a stewardship. His essence is his existence 
before God and to God, as it is from Him. His dignity is 
an "alien dignity," an evaluation that is not of him but 
placed upon him by divine degree.... It is precisely 
the little ones who have hardly any human claims who are 
sought out and covered by his mercy. (p. 74)• 
It is precisely when all reasonable natural grounds for 
hope are gone that one needs hope and may hope in God, 
even as when all hope was gone Abraham hoped on in 
faith, (p. 75)25 
In Graham Scott, a United Church minister, we see a 
further use of scripture as a basis for theological expres-
sion. 
The fact is that no where in the Bible can It be said con-
clusively that abortion is mentioned either in praise or 
in condemnation. However, it may well be referred to in 
four instances, namely, Galations 5:20 "idolatry, medicine 
(sorcery), enmity . . ."; Revelation or Apocalypse 9:21 
"nor did they repent of their murders or their medicines 
(sorceries) or their immorality"; Revelation 21:3 ". . . 
as for murders, fornicators, medicine-men (sorcerers), 
idolators . . ."; and Revelation 22:15 "Outside are the 
dogs and medicine-men (sorcerers) and fornicators and 
murders. . . . " The Greek words that I have translated 
medicine or medicine-men are related to our word "pharmacy" 
and mean at root either poison or medicine. Now one of 
the jobs of these medicine-men or sorcerers was the pro-
curing of abortions. This is surely at least one of the 
reasons and perhaps the main reason why this kind of 
medicine-sorcery was condemned along with murder and 
promiscuity by the texts. In any case, it is note-worthy 
that the Didache, an important early second century manual 
of Christian discipline, specifies: "thou shalt not use 
magic; thou shalt not use medicine; thou shalt not procure 
abortion, nor commit infanticide." (2.2) 
25 
^Passages quoted, except for Biblical references, are 
from, Paul Ramsey, "The Morality of Abortion," Life or Death, 
ed. by Daniel H. Lobley (Portland: University of Washington 
Press, 1963). The numbers in brackets at end of quoted para-
graphs refer to the page numbers in the book. 
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Then Scott mentions scriptural references in which 
fetuses seem to be affected by God's presence: Ps. 139:5-16, 
Job 3:16, the Jeremiah reference (1:5), and the leaping of 
the babe in Elizabeth's womb when Mary, pregnant with Jesus, 
came to visit her. Here, Elizabeth called Mary, "the mother 
of my Lord" (Luke 1:43) which suggests that in the womb, Jesus 
was truly the human-divine creature He was in later life. 
On page 34 of the thesis I mentioned Exodus 21:22-25 as 
the only explicit reference to abortion. Scott suggests that 
it not be taken as a proof text. 
If all we had were the Old Testament, and of the Old 
Testament all that we valued were the books of the Law, 
then this text might be decisive. But Christians cannot 
ignore the prophets and the psalms which bore witness to 
Christ, nor can we ignore the distinction between God's 
law and Moses' law which our Lord made on several occa-
sions, notably in Matthew 19:8. When asked why Moses gave 
a commandment to give a certificate of divorce to put one's 
wife away, Jesus said, "For your hardness of heart Moses 
allowed you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning 
it was not so." . . . Jesus laid down the moral truth; 
Moses had not only to lay down truth but to legislate for 
his society. Therefore, when we seek to learn from the 
Old Testament, we must beware of mistaking human tradi-
tions for God's will.26 
The question we immediately ask Is, "What grounds 
have we to say that this Exodus text is a human tradition?" 
unless we compare the whole passage on human violence from 
which it Is taken, Exodus 25:12-27, with Jesus' words, in 
Matthew 5:38-43, "You have heard that it was said, 'An eye 
All passages quoted under discussion of Scott are from 
a mimeographed paper he wrote. Graham A. P. Scott, "A Paper 
on the issue of Abortion and Bill C-195 in the Light of the 
Bible and the Canadian Bill of Rights," 9 pp. 
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for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.' But I say to you, Do 
not resist one who is evil . . . turn to him the other 
[cheek] . . . Love your enemies and pray for those who per-
secute you. . . . " If we do this in proper logic we would 
say that the person who causes the miscarriage of a woman 
should be forgiven and left to God's judgement. On the 
other hand, we would be wrong in assuming that Jesus thought 
abortion was alright. He did not hammer away at the obvious 
moral truths about killing life. He usually started from the 
obvious, the socially accepted, and went on from there. "Un-
less your righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and 
Pharisees, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven" 
(Matt. 5:20). It should be noted that abortion has never 
been a serious problem for Jews until the last few centuries. 
Jesus presumably did not speak about it because it was prac-
ticed so little, if at all, amongst his people. 
C. The Contextual Approach: The Fetus As a Value Among 
Values 
Not all of the Christian positions on abortion focus 
attention on the question, "Who has ultimate claim on the 
fetus?" Those who call themselves contextualists or situa-
tionalists would rather aim for the answer to another question 
as their basic goal: "In a given circumstance what values or 
value should be given highest priority?". Now those referred 
to in Part B are interested in weighing values too, but unlike 
the contextualist, they assume that any given fetus must have 
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the same basic right to live as any other given fetus, just 
as a given person should have the same basic right to live 
as another person. That right to them maybe less than that 
of a postnatal human but it is not any less than some other 
fetus. The contextualist does not see it this way. He does 
not assume that a given fetus should have the same basic 
right to live as another fetus. Fetal value is not a con-
stant for all fetuses. Fetal value is a variable along with 
other variables and every decision about abortion must be 
carefully thought through as an individual case, even situ-
ations where the right decision appears obvious to the the-
ologians in Part B. 
There is an illustration of this in the writings of 
Joseph Fletcher, a contextualist. Fletcher says, "In most 
situations birth control by prevention is better than 
abortion,' i.e. there may be a situation somewhere where 
one would be better to forgo contraception and allow abor-
tion instead. To Fletcher, it is not obvious that preven-
tion of unwanted pregnancy is always better than abortion. 
Now Ramsey, a non-contextualist, thinks that prevention is 
always better than abortion, and demands an example that would 
23 prove the exception. 
Despite their hesitance about working from principles 
27 
Fletcher, Situation Ethics, p. 122. 
28 
Paul Ramsey, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 220. 
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in a prescriptive manner, some contextualists can be found to 
uphold their own values as principles. For instance, Joseph 
Fletcher declares that the only rule in ethics should be the 
rule of agape love. What agape dictates should be the deter-
minant. Otherwise, he affirms, the only rule is that there 
is an exception to every rule. Nevertheless, when speaking 
about abortion he says at one point, "No unwanted or unin-
tended baby should ever be born," which is as strong a rule 
29 as any. y 
John C. Bennett, another contextualist, at least 
regarding abortion, claimed that he was "shocked" that Common-
weal, a liberal Catholic journal, should uphold the traditional 
Catholic dogma on abortion. 
This invoking of one law or principle in isolation and 
without regard to other human circumstances is a harsh 
and unconvincing form of legalism. 
But like Fletcher, he too, makes his own principles. 
He would advocate legal abortion because of qualitative dif-
ferences between mother and child, because of fetal abnor-
malities, and because of his belief that a strict law en-
courages women to go to dangerous illegal abortionists. 
Actually, what Bennett wants is a law which will allow per-
sons to choose abortion according to conscience, within the 
boundaries he suggests.™ 
29 
Fletcher, Situation Ethics, p. 39. 
30 
John C. Bennett, "Editorial," Christianity and Crisis, 
XXVII (March 20, 1967). The quotes and references on Bennett 
are in the two pages of the editorial, pp. 47-43. 
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The Board of Social Ministry of the Lutheran Church 
in America (L.C.A.) has published a booklet containing the 
views of two of its members, Frederick K. Wentz and Robert 
H. Witmer, though their views are not the official position 
of the church. They follow a line of thinking similar to 
Bennett's, i.e. abortion should be allowed within a framework 
of certain points of stress. "For the Christian conscience 
the central question is, 'What is God's will at this point 
of decision'?" The authors believe that God's will can be 
found best under a number of possibilities which they group 
together under the heading of "compassionate abortion." This 
* 
position, "takes seriously the rights of fetal life but gives 
priority consideration to the needs and circumstances of the 
pregnant woman, including her present family responsibilities." 
There are four categories for compassionate abortion: medical, 
eugenic, humanitarian (rape, incent, pregnancy under 15 years) 
and socio-economic indications. One could criticize these 
categories as permissive, but the authors hope for some res-
traint through the counselling sessions which the mothers 
have before being allowed abortion. Despite this, abortion 
appears to depend upon the subjective evaluation of mother 
and counsellors rather than upon some agreed-upon standard.^ 
The late Raymond Hord, former secretary of the Board 
^ Frederich K. Wentz and Robert H. Witmer, "The Problem 
of Abortion," Studies in Man, Medicine and Theology (New 
York: Board of Social Theology, Lutheran Church in America, 
1967), pp. 21-24. 
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of Evangelism of the United Church of Canada was mentioned 
earlier in the discussion of United Church views. He con-
tended that the fetus should be a matter of subjective 
evaluation. He explained: 
The Christian ethic is not one of perfection but a con-
textual one where decisions are made in the light of all 
the circumstances facing us in a given situation. 
. . . Our United Church brief declares that the foetus 
which has very simple beginnings has accruing value. . . . 
We cannot equate the value of the foetus in its early 
stages with the value of the foetus in its later stages 
or with the born child. And if an abortion is required 
it should be performed in the first months of pregnancy, 
if at all possible.32 
As stated earlier, this "accruing" value was that which 
it had to the mother as it grew older. 
Dr. Hord's thesis was also based upon some other fac-
tors—the generosity of nature in producing sperms and eggs, 
and the fact that one of five abortions are spontaneous. If 
nature aborts anyway, should we be concerned with the loss of 
fetal life? Dr. Victor A. McKusic, chief of medical genetics 
at John Hopkins University cites different but even more 
compelling statistics for this: 
Of every 1,000 fertilized ova—female eggs fertilized by 
the male sperm—25O never even become implanted in the 
womb. They just get lost and float away. 
Another 150 become loosened and lost shortly after im-
plantation, before the woman even knows she is pregnant. 
Another 100 are lost in spontaneous abortion some time 
in pregnancy's first 20 weeks. This leaves only 500 
that become babies. Ten are still-born. Ninety are 
either born prematurely or possess birth defects or .^ 
often both (though premature babies may be quite healthy). 
Bill C-122, Bill C-123, Bill C-124, p. 629-
33 
Victor A. McKusic, "Geneticists Hope to Curb Birthrate 
of Defectives," Kitchener-Waterloo Record (August 15, 1963), 
P- 30. 
With only fifty per cent fertilized ova ever being 
born, one could argue that humanity should have at least an 
equal opportunity as blind and fickle nature to determine 
which fertilized ova will be born. Moreover, if these 
little creatures are made in God's image and we humans can 
do so little to save them, at least in the early stages of 
growth, should not God be more concerned in saving them? If 
God allows fifty per cent to die naturally, why should we be 
so concerned with saving those we do not want?34 
In 1970, three states, Hawaii, Maryland, and New York, 
passed laws that provide for abortion as a matter between 
doctor and patient. The 2,000 delegate American Protestant 
Hospital Association upheld the same position on the grounds 
that "the integrity of the family unit and the institution 
of marriage is jeopardized, if not destroyed, by unwanted 
children." The editorial staff of The Christian Century 
also upheld this view. ^  
-*^ 0n the other hand we could argue that the great loss 
in previable humanity is a challenge to medicine no less im-
portant than the challenge of deadly disease. Indeed, because 
Ihey are in God's image, medicine should attempt to prevent 
fetal loss with the same vigour it has for preventing disease. 
A "Save the Embryos Fund" would have as much justification as 
a "Save the Children's Fund." By research we might not only 
be able to save more fetuses but also able to provide means 
for determining sex and other factors. Research is being 
done for economic reasons on cows and ewes to reduce the rate 
of failure in their pregnancies. Why should human fetuses be 
of less concern in terms of pregnancy success? 
01 
Editorial, "Summit Conference on Abortion," The 
Christian Century, LXXXVII (March 25, 1970), p. 343. The 
quote from The American Protestant Hospital Association and 
the statement of the editorial staff of The Christian Century 
are both found here. 
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In fairness, neither the American Protestant Hospi-
tal Association nor The Christian Century should be identified 
as purely contextualist in thinking. But these answers to the 
abortion problem are clearly examples of contextual ethics, 
where mother and doctor try to estimate the priorities of the 
situation without recourse to public law. 
CHAPTER V 
SOURCES FOR THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS 
Now that we have seen the positions of churches and 
individual theologians, we have the task of sorting out a 
theological answer. I suggest that we first try to esta-
blish the sources on which we can base an answer. God, 
himself, is the prime source. God's will is the right 
answer. The question is, where do we find it? 
A. Scripture 
Being of the Protestant tradition,it would be 
normal for me to look for scriptural sources for direction. 
I would agree with Graham Scott, however, that there is no 
proof text. The Exodus passage, if taken alone, implies 
that the mother is of more value than the fetus, but it is 
also true that the husband was master of both. The Exodus 
passage implies that human life is divided in terms of 
worth in certain circumstances. Since, as Christians, we 
believe all are one in Christ, we should not feel obligated 
to follow Old Testament Law where this status difference is 
made. Like Scott, too, I do not think that the references 
to "medicines," "sorcerers," or "sorcerys" in the New Testa-
ment give us much security. The sorcerer would be involved 
in questionable practices other than abortion, and which ones 
the passages refer to we cannot tell by the word "sorcerer" or 
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"medicine-men. 
If scripture is to be relied on, it must be by infer-
ence, by passages which tell of the value God has for the 
fetus and by his general outlook on man. In men like Barth, 
Thielicke, and Ramsey, we have seen those passages of scrip-
ture which speak of God's relation to man in the womb. These 
passages are brief but mention that God speaks to the pre-
natal creature. They say that something goes on or can go 
on between Him and incipient life. They acknowledge that God 
cares for the fetus. Other than that they say little. With 
them we have insufficient evidence for a strong statement. 
If we look at the New Testament as a whole and see 
what Jesus Christ means to man, we might find more evidence 
by inference. "God so loved the world that he gave his only 
Son" (John 3-*l6). This shows how much God cares for man. He 
gave his best and when God gives his best, then he cares for 
us infinitely. But does this mean that he cares to the same 
degree for the fetus? Ramsey thinks it does: 
It is precisely the little ones who have hardly any 
human claims who are sought out and covered by his 
mercy.1 
When Jesus speaks about gathering Jerusalem around him as a 
hen would gather her chicks, when he warns, "If any man would 
cause these little ones to sin it were better that a milestone 
were hung around his neck and he be thrown into the sea," we 
have this same tenderness. Young and old, all are the flock 
Ramsey, Life or Death, p. 74-
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of the Good Shepherd. 
We must then ask, would he differentiate between the 
fetus unborn and the little ones who are born? Are fetuses 
too, part of his flock? If God so loved the world, would he 
not also love those unborn "lambs"? By inference I believe 
the answer is "yes." The one who, in Christ, refuses to 
differentiate between men, women and children, would carry 
this attitude through to the unborn child. The Christ who 
died for you and me has died also for those who are in the 
womb. 
Does this mean that we have no right to commit abor-
4 
tion? The answer to this comes from the New Testament doc-
trine of man's relation to man. Here again we must work by 
inference. Jesus is not only God's Son, he is our brother, 
and as our brother, through faith, God adopts us as his sons. 
As adopted sons we are to be brothers and neighbours to one 
another in him. "When you have done it unto the least of 
these my brethern, you have done it unto me." The prenatal 
infant could be interpreted as one of the least of Jesus' 
brethren. The infant's blindness and immaturity would then 
be no barrier to our being neighbour to him. We would have 
a duty as Christians to bring him into this world and give 
him the necessities of life. The fact that he is illigitimate 
or deformed or undesired would not detract from God's concern 
for him and from his command to be neighbours to him. It would 
also mean that we should be neighbour to those who suffer from 
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the unwanted pregnancy. Caught in the guilt of premarital 
"accident," or coming at a time when the mother is in physi-
cal or mental stress, our answer would be to act out what it 
means to be neighbour to both creatures. With compassion 
parallel to that which God had in sending his Son, we would 
try to help the mother bear her suffering. If secrecy or 
financial help are needed we would provide agencies of con-
crete help. If she were psychologically disturbed, we would 
treat her lovingly as a psychologically disturbed person. Be-
cause drug therapy is dangerous to the fetus we would probably 
try other means and help her to accept her child as a precious 
little person. If her life were threatened, we might abort 
her so that at least one life could survive. This one case 
for abortion would be as a last resort, after all medical 
direction pointed towards its necessity to preserve the life 
of the mother, after God had been asked to intervene where 
humanity could not help. If the baby were the result of rape, 
incest, adultery, or fornication and the mother and father 
were guilt-ridden (it is not necessarily the case!) we would 
treat them as anyone else like this. Since the fetus was not 
the evil we would not try to solve the dilemma by getting rid 
of it. 
Scripture does not give us clear direction about un-
wanted pregnancy. But it does give a clear picture of God's 
grace, his power to overcome all things in those who would 
trust in Him. It commands us to have reverence for human 
life. While all pregnancies demand a sacrifice of the mother, 
and the unwanted pregnancy makes it more difficult to bear, 
the commandment of God to be neighbour to those in need 
carries with it the promise of comfort and aid. 
Furthermore, there is the promise of forgiveness in 
the Cross. He bore our grief, our pain, our sin, and over-
came them so that he might reconcile us all to Himself, no 
matter what our trouble. In' the sin of promiscuous sex, in 
the vicissitudes of sexual life in and out of marriage, ac-
cident and innocence, passion and selfishness, combine some-
times to produce unwanted pregnancies, prenatal life for whom 
Christ died. Most wanted children too are not the result of 
planning, but the result of an "accident." Most wanted 
children are unwanted sometime during the pregnancy. Most 
women with undesirable pregnancies learn to love the child 
when it becomes a baby in her arms. As the old Russian 
proverb has it: "Two small hands upon the breast, and labour 
is forgotten." 
The agony of pregnancy is with nearly every woman, 
in morning sickness, bleeding, fatigue. Its being unwanted 
adds to the burden and may make it look more evil than it is. 
But, says scripture, all of these can be born in God's grace 
and-human comfort. Scripture commands us to be uncondemning 
and helpful, acting as though sin has already been forgiven— 
in our hearts, at least—looking upon the person as one in 
need. 
61 
Scripture offers no proof-text, but it offers a sound 
outlook for the Christian. It values human life as precious 
in God's eyes rather than expendable because of primitiveness 
or weakness; it suggests that we be neighbours to both parties 
within the context of God's victory over suffering, rather 
than hand-wringing judges between distressed parties; it 
offers forgiveness instead of leniency, and it points to con-
fidence in God's love for the weak rather than despair over the 
immensity of the problem. Finally, it does not say, but it 
implies that the solution to the unwanted pregnancy lies in 
other directions—in prevention by responsible sex and support 
for those who are pregnant. 
B. Natural Law 
Because we find in scripture only inferences about 
abortion, we are forced to look beyond it for help in our 
problem. Because the fetus is a "constant" for the purpose 
of our ethical discussion, perhaps the problem is one of 
weighing other factors or "variables" in relation to it. 
It would be wonderful if we could simply apply a given value 
to this constant and then merely relate the other values in 
categories and so devise a set of straightforward moral pres-
criptions. Unfortunately it is not that easy. 
The problem cannot be solved as a mathematical one, 
but it can be viewed in functional terms. In our survey of 
Christian and non-Christian attitudes, we have seen the value 
of the fetus in terms of the mother's life, health, etc, 
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according to the values given it by mother, society, God, 
etc. This type of thinking can be called natural law 
thinking. It hopes to reach universal norms, or, more 
accurately, it thinks from ideas that it already believes 
are universal norms. 
One does not have to be a Roman Catholic to apply 
the principle of natural law. In Karl Barth we can see the 
"natural law" principle at work. While Barth takes great 
pains in his Church Dogmatics to prove that scripture must 
corroborate theological thinking, he does not use scripture 
to corroborate the main axiom of his position on abortion— 
that the fetus is human. He just states that this is so and 
then uses scripture to prove how much God cares for the fetus. 
In his own mind he creates a universal norm, the axiom that 
the fetus is human. 
The other Continental theologians and Ramsey and 
Scott all do the same. Just as the Criminal Code of Canada 
defines what is human for its purposes (page of the thesis) 
so do these theologians state what is human for their purposes. 
If we look upon the problem as one of finding a uni-
versal norm for treatment of the fetus, we go a long way in 
solving the problem of abortion, particularly as a legal 
problem. For once we have established a universal norm, 
then we can make laws in terms of it. 
I have stated that scripture suggests by inference 
that the fetus is very valuable in the eyes of God. I did 
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not say that scripture says it is human or prehuman, or human 
enough. I meant that it was so valuable to God that we should 
avoid aborting it unless the mother's life was at stake or 
likely to be endangered. This, I suggest to be a universal 
norm. It is theological; it avoids the humanity question; 
it points to solutions which edify all persons concerned; it 
allows God to have His sovereignty over all prenatal life and 
to play an important role in its solution; it assumes right-
fully that God is Lord of the state which will make the laws on 
abortion. 
C. Contextual Ethics 
Contextual or situational thinking is the only type of 
theological thinking I have found that gives an alternative 
to the "natural law" approach to abortion. 
To a certain extent the contextualists take seriously 
the New Testament position of being neighbour to one's fellow 
man. They press for loving one's neighbour in a community 
context. Because our community or society is pluralistic 
they sympathize with the desire to let persons decide abortion 
from their own conscience and not from some external authority 
such as the church or the state unless they wish to do so. 
They have a great deal of sympathy for the woman with an un-
wanted pregnancy and tend to accuse her background, her 
ignorance of.sex, harsh conditions in family and economic life, 
more than they accuse her. They abhor the back-alley abortion-
ist and the abortion-mill, and strive for clinical settings 
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with proper maternal care. When she comes for pastoral 
counselling, the mother is allowed to make up her mind 
after being shown the alternatives, and, for the most part 
allowed to have the abortion if she wishes. In short, there 
is a strong desire to ease her pain and relieve her stress 
so that she can return to normal activities. 
But they also let the value of the pregnancy be a 
matter of private judgement, in effect, a matter of per-
sonal expediency. In this way, they do a poor job in pro-
tecting the life of the other neighbour, the fetus. Their 
neighbourliness is only partial. 
Furthermore, they speak with little reference to 
Christian tradition. They neglect the historical Christian 
community and its doctrine. They do not emerge from it with 
new ideas, but speak new ideas in semi-isolation. For this 
reason, I hesitate to endorse the present prescriptions for 
abortion laws suggested by the contextualists as serious 
presentations. I believe that theologians should prescribe 
only theological answers to theological problems such as abor-
tion when they can give sound presentations from within the 
theological community. In my view the contextual presenta-
tions I have read lack sound roots. 
Of course, the abortion problem is difficult for the-
ology because of uncertainties about prenatal life. We can 
best infer conclusions from our doctrines of man after birth. 
Therefore, we should not expect an airtight position from the 
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contextualists, only a better developed position than has been 
shown so far. 
In looking for a strategy for contextual ethics, 
Edward LeRoy Long, Jr., advocates "an even more contextual 
contextualism": 
Are not certain matters most helpfully and simply handled 
by laws; others by principles; and still others by the 
situational approach? If so, then we should call for an 
even more contextual contextualism, one that refuses to 
be bound by the "in-principled rejection" of any particu-
lar way of formulating or applying Christian norms. Such 
a flexible, or non-ideological, contextualism would not 
claim that it alone has the valid contributions of any 
Christian ethic which bears fruit in neighbour love. If 
the fruit can be borne by a mature reliance upon rules, 
modified as necessary by casuistries, let it be respected. 
If the fruit comes from an idealistic or teleological ethic 
which handles these matters in terms of basic principles 
and their application, why cast it away? If the situation 
requires a contextual response to deal maturely with the 
contingent and unusual circumstances being encountered, let 
that be embraced in the freedom of the Gospel without re-
quiring that the resultant way of dealing with the issue 
become paradigmatic for all Christian living!2 
Some time in the future the contextual approach may 
produce a better approach to the ethics of abortion than an 
approach that starts out with establishing principles. I 
suspect, however, that because of the nature of the abortion 
problem, contextualism would play a more appropriate role as 
a counselling device. The military divides its fighting 
roles into two main areas—strategy and tactics. Strategy is 
the development of an overall plan for action; tactics are 
the means to be used at the local level in order to work out 
Edward Long, Jr., A Survey of Christian Ethics (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 312. 
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the strategy. To solve abortion problems we need strategy 
based on principles, and we need tactics based from analysis 
of the specific situation. Contextual ethics is suited for 
tactics but not for strategy and we should not depend on it 
alone or primarily in order to solve our problems in abortion. 
CHAPTER VI 
TOWARDS AN ABORTION LAW 
A. Every Law Has Theological Implications 
It has been argued that since we live in a pluralis-
tic society, laws should be framed which allow freedom for 
the expression of all theologies and ideologies. John Turner, 
the Canadian Minister of Justice, spoke in this vein when he 
introduced into the House of Commons the Criminal Law Amend-
ment Bill (1963-69) which contained ,our present abortion law 
in Canada. 
Our response to this bill will depend upon our tolerance 
and our understanding of the needs of a pluralistic 
society, a society in which everyone must strive to re-
concile his opinion and personal beliefs.1 
It must be understood though, that since abortion has 
theological implications—the right to destroy prenatal life, 
and the value of that life—that any law will at least imply 
a theological position. Therefore, if one tries to "recon-
cile his opinions and personal beliefs" the answer he arrives 
at will be just as theological as the one he has forsaken. 
For instance, if one argues that there should be no law at all 
regarding abortion, one implies that the question of whether 
to destroy or preserve a given prenatal life is purely a mat-
ter of expediency and the value of that life is estimated only 
Canada, Parliament, Hansard (House of Commons) 1963-
1969, 2nd Session, 28th Parliament, second reading of Criminal 
Law Amendment Bill, p. 4713. 
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in terms of what it means to the others involved. If one 
says that the law should concern itself only with serious 
threats to the physical health of the mother and should 
otherwise preserve the fetus, then one places a much higher 
value on the unborn child. The second answer should not be 
regarded as more "theological" than the first. 
No matter what we say or do not say about abortion, 
we make theological assumptions. And no matter how liberal 
or open-minded we try to be we inevitably make restrictive, 
not permissive theological statements. Suppose we choose 
to leave the question of abortion to private conscience. 
Ostensibly we would be letting everybody have his way. But 
really we would be denying the wishes of all those who want 
abortion as a matter of public conscience embodied in law. 
There are those who think of abortion as a matter of private 
morality, and those who think of it as a matter of public 
morality. There are those who think of God as Lord over the 
law, and those who would keep Him out. These positions are 
more a matter of transforming opinion by sound and right 
reasoning than reconciling it. 
As Christians, we have a duty to make our contribution 
to the public discussion. We go wrong only if we present bad 
theology, not Christian theology, and if we, like anyone else, 
fail to understand the reasons for the agony about this pro-
blem. We must aim for a good law, based as closely as pos-
sible on the will of God. 
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B. One's Position on Abortion Influences the Rights of 
Postnatal Life 
Secondly, the position one takes on abortion 
strengthens or weakens his argument for the sanctity of 
postnatal life. If one holds that abortion should be 
permitted only to protect the life of the mother, one 
implies that prenatal life is precious, and if prenatal life 
is precious then postnatal life must be precious too. On the 
other hand, by postulating permissive abortion one implies 
that prenatal life has little inherent value and only by 
technical distinction, with no basis in biology, can one 
still hold that postnatal life is very precious. As Ralph 
B. Potter says: 
When a fetus is aborted no one asks for whom the bell 
tolls. No bell is tolled. But do not feel indiffer-
ent and secure. The fetus symbolizes you and me and 
our tenuous hold upon a future here at the mercy of 
our fellow men.2 
It is bad law to try to uphold postnatal human life 
as inviolable while affording little or no protection to 
prenatal life. If we do, we live a lie unto ourselves, we mo 
our laws based on human rights, for we know that the differ-
ence between a life born and a life unborn can be as little 
as the difference in circulatory systems. We know that there 
is continuity of growth from conception to birth, just as 
there is a continuity of growth from birth to maturity. We 
know that fetal life is primitive, helpless, and dependent, 
2 
Potter, Religious Situation, p. 157. 
70 
but we also know that babies are totally dependent on parents, 
and most children are largely dependent on others until six-
teen years of age or more. We know that communication between 
the fetus and mother is very primitive, but we also know that 
babies are at least a year old before being able to talk. We 
know that "God-talk" is useless until a child has grasped 
the meaning of parental love in terms of language, yet we 
also believe in child baptism where God does something for 
the child because he is not limited by verbal language. All 
signs of humanity point to a continuity between prenatal and 
postnatal life. Why, then, should there be a sudden difference 
in regard for prenatal life? Because we cannot see the pain 
or torn limbs or hear any cries? Yes, I think that is as 
good an answer as any. No one tolls the bell for the fetus 
because the operation in a hospital is done under anaesthetic 
and medical personnel are trained to do the job impassively. 
The fetal remains are put in a paper bag and placed in the 
garbage. The doctor washes up and the mother is wheeled into 
the recovery room. Is it murder? Not unless the law says 
it is, some will sayv But what greater right have we to live 
than that unwanted fetus? Why should one's being wanted ever 
have anything to do with the privilege of being born? Who 
says that the state has the ultimate authority over life and 
death? Who gave this right, if not God? And why does Canada 
pass a law for the abolition of capital punishment and yet 
pass another law which allows abortion in cases where a woman's 
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health is only likely to be endangered; i.e., why is a murderer's 
life more sacred than a fetal life? 
C. Pluralism without Permissiveness 
Traditionally, the Christian has claimed that God is 
Lord over the state. In days of Christendom this was easy to 
apply to issues such as abortion. In our present religiously 
heterogeneous era it is objected to by many. Nevertheless 
the objections can not usurp God from His rightful place and 
Christians should not feel compelled to give into those who 
raise objections. We should shamelessly announce that we 
believe. 
For various reasons, perhaps as outlined by Ralph 
Potter, Jr., earlier in the thesis, the general public at-
titude has been moving toward a relaxation of abortion laws. 
It is the people's attitude, not the inherent value of the 
fetus or a worsening of the suffering of pregnant women that 
has been changing. I believe that those who press for more 
liberal therapeutic abortion laws have let the horror of 
suffering distort their perspective so that they erroneously 
value the mother's health, or even conscience, over the life 
of the unborn child, thus placing priority in the wrong place. 
Furthermore, instead of seeking to relieve the conditions 
which promote abortion, they would liberalize the law so that 
inadvertently society becomes abortifacient rather than 
abortion preventative. Liberalized laws always lead to in-
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creased legal abortions without eliminating illegal abortions.-' 
The cost in hospital beds, maternal care, and the caustic at-
titude to prenatal life all go up. And meanwhile, we approach 
a few steps closer to the human degradation of a Brave New 
World. 
People know intellectually that what is legal is not 
necessarily moral, but in practice may tend to be only as 
moral as the law demands, especially when under stress. What 
the law permits does have an effect on what we do. A law on 
abortion has its own educative value. It has a greater effect 
if the reasons given are sound and they are explained. If, for 
instance, we permit abortion on a restricted basis only, and 
say that this is because the fetus is valuable, we say that 
persons in general are valuable, and the law will play a role 
in helping persons to revere all human life. All persons con-
cerned are affected in their attitudes by the law and in the 
course of decision look to it for guidance. 
D. Abortion to Protect the Life of the Mother 
I would recommend that abortion should be legally per-
mitted only in the case where a woman's life is threatened by 
the pregnancy. This could be interpreted to include instances 
where her health is endangered to the extent that she might 
die. The value of the fetus is no greater than that of the 
-'For example, in Czechoslovakia with permissive laws 
there were 142 known illegal abortions in 1963; 49 in 1964, 
and 70 in I965. Those figures compare with 70,546 legal 
abortions in 1963, 70,693 in 1964 and 79,591 in 1965. Bill 
C-122, Bill C-123, Bill C-I36, p. 370. 
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mother and she should be permitted abortion when she is 
threatened by such grave circumstances. 
Abortion only on the grounds of threat to the mother's 
life would be a strict law. It would admittedly cause some 
women to seek out illegal abortionists. It would raise the 
cry of "cruelty!" by liberal reformers. It would cause 
grouchy reaction from those who want their freedom to decide. 
Many doctors would ignore it. A "reactionary" law as proposed 
here is out of step with the public mood. In fact, the 
Minister of Justice has been quoted at the time of this writing 
as saying that there is no "imminent" proposal to have the 
abortion laws changed, as though there is such a possibility 
in the future. With the repeal of abortion laws in three of 
the United States, liberal reformers in Canada have received 
added momentum for either liberal interpretations of our present 
law, or repeal of it on the same grounds. Ironically, it may 
be the proximity of New York State that could alleviate the 
pressure, by Canadian women making use of its facilities in-
stead of pressuring for reform here. Whatever the case, the 
position of this paper is as popular as an attack on "mother-
hood" (pun intended). 
Nevertheless, a study of the experience of aborti-
facient countries reveals the high price paid for such 
freedom. If morality will not bring a return to stricter law, 
the cost of increased gynacological problems and premature 
births may cause enough abhorrence to reverse the present 
climate. 
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Dr. Alan Guttmacher, president of the Planned Parent-
hood-World Population Association, speaks about creating 
"abortoriums" for the estimated 50,000 to 100,000 New York 
City women wanting abortion each year under the new law. 
How soothing is his statement, "An abortion is one of the 
simplest and safest of all operations—safer than a routine 
tonsilectomy," before the New York law has come into effect.4 
But do we hear such words from Britain after its laws have 
been in force for two years? Or in the Soviet bloc nations, 
or in Japan after years of permissiveness? In Britain there 
is alarm about the health of women who have undergone abortion 
because of poor sanitary facilities and short convalescence. 
The doctors who run the clinics get rich quickly and are sus-
pected of caring more for the money than for the patients. In 
the Soviet bloc nations, Bulgaria and Rumania have made note-
worthy restrictions on former permissive laws; and Andras 
Klinger of the Hungarian Central Office of Statistics re-
ports on the effects of abortion in the European socialist 
countries: "Its deleterious effect on health is sufficient 
reason to change the present day situation."5 In the same 
vein, Japanese women members of the Diet have complained about 
the damage to the health of Japanese women because of wide-
^Globe and Mail (April 11, 1970). 
^Bills C-122, C-123, C-136, p. 675- See page 27 for 
restrictions on Rumanian and Bulgarian abortion laws. 
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open abortion laws. 
It may be that Canada will have to go all the way 
and repeal its abortion laws completely before there is a 
return to stricter ones. In the present climate, this 
thesis is too late to affect the laws passed in 1969, and 
most likely too early to receive much attention for con-
servative reform. In the meantime, I hope that it may be 
used as part of the evidence that is necessary for more 
comprehensive and deeper understandings of abortion and 
its related problems. 
I heard this from a Catholic priest home on furlough 
from Japan. 
CONCLUSION 
This study has been an attempt to find legal terms 
for abortion based upon sound theology. Near the beginning 
I pointed out how the formulation of any law on abortion is 
dependent upon theological suppositions involved in the 
value of the fetus and the right to abort it. We found in 
the course of study that there were two main channels of 
Christian and logical thinking: thinking based on the an-
swer to the question, "Who has ultimate claim upon the fetus?" 
and thinking based on the answer to the question, "In a given 
situation which values should receive priority?". In actual 
fact, we found that apparent conflict was solved if we used 
the first question as a basis for "strategic" thinking and 
the second question for "tactical" thinking. We found that 
the first question helped us establish principles by which to 
formulate a law and the second helped us find the answer for 
a specific situation from the "context" (hence, contextual 
ethics) of these principles and other factors. The conflict 
came only when some theologians, such as Fletcher and Bennett 
tried to deny the validity of principles which they did not 
like, while wanting to create some of their own. 
In formulating the law that I have suggested, we can 
see both of these questions being answered, not mutually ex-
clusive of one another, but in harmony with one another. In 
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answering the question about ultimate claim upon the fetus, 
I suggested by inference from scripture that God alone has 
ultimate claim on the fetus, and that since He considers 
the incipient life very valuable, then so should we. In 
answering the second question about values receiving 
priority, again by inference from scripture I suggested that 
we look to the question, "What does it mean to be neighbour?"; 
the values which come from this should give us the basis for 
the particular situation. 
This results in the conclusion that the removal of the 
fetus from the mother should take place only when both can 
survive, which, of course, is not abortion. One cannot be 
neighbour to the fetus by aborting him. If, however, due to 
some medical problem of the mother the pregnancy acts as a 
threat to her life, then she should be allowed to have it 
aborted, for in this case we are better to be neighbour to one 
of the two lives than let both of them die. 
The law, then, should permit abortion where there is 
a serious threat to the life of the mother by the pregnancy. 
Our discussion ended with this proposition. The 
law will never be vindicated, however, unless it is accom-
panied by reforms in related areas. There must be an al-
leviation of the desire for abortion. To this end I can see 
three necessary preconditions: a growing reverence for pre-
natal life, means for preventing pregnancy except when a 
child is wanted, and financial as well as counselling help 
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for women distressed by unwanted pregnancies. 
The first of these means a change in human attitudes. 
It is the most basic, because, I suggest, most abortions take 
place primarily as a result of moral indifference to the fetus. 
Karl Barth has said: "The only thing which can help is the 
power of a wholly new and radical feeling of awe at the mystery 
of all human life as this is commanded by God as its Creator, 
Giver and Lord."1 Ralph Potter, Jr., maintains that words 
are not enough to achieve this. Deeds, too, are needed. 
It is best conveyed by demonstrating respect for life in 
all its forms through the courage of an institution or 
an individual to sacrifice wealth and prestige and station 
in defense of the poor, the aged, the outcast in the 
ghetto, and the victims of war. Churchmen and theolo-
gians must exhibit in their relations with men the same 
sacrifice of self in love which they have required of 
mothers menaced by their own offspring.2 
Yet, at a time when persons are determined to have as 
few limits as possible, contraceptive means to prevent unwant-
ed pregnancies are necessary. Too often these days contra-
ceptives fail or are not used properly and pregnancy results, 
and since the couple thought they were being careful and res-
ponsible, they blame the pregnancy on the failure of the con-
traceptive and feel justified in having an abortion. It is 
ironical that in promising freedom from unwanted pregnancy, 
the Pill has apparently helped to create a more permissive 
climate for abortion. The ideal, I suggest, would be a long 
term contraceptive for men, lasting from the onset of puberty 
Barth, Church Dogmatics, III, 4, P- 417-
2 
Potter, J., Religious Situation, 1963, p. 157-
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until the time for the fathering of children in marriage. 
Following the birth of the desired number of children, the 
same long-range contraceptive could be used. Until such 
a drug or device is invented, voluntary sterilization of 
either the mother or father after the birth of the last 
desired child would at least reduce unwanted pregnancies 
in family situations. 
The third precondition is becoming more popular. In 
Denmark there are Mother's Aid Centres to help women distressed 
with undesired pregnancies. In Sweden there are similar 
counselling centres. And, since 1968, there has been Birth-
right in North America, "where help is as near as the tele-
phone." Unless we can offer a woman help to carry her 
pregnancy to term and provide satisfactory answers regarding 
the placing of the child afterwards, she may be too depressed 
to carry on with the pregnancy. 
Finally, without getting engrossed in aspects of the 
problem beyond the range of this paper, I must briefly sug-
gest some other areas of study. As a theological problem, 
abortion should not be considered an isolated issue. It is 
one of several related issues that raise questions about the 
value of individual human life; issues like euthenasia, capital 
punishment, population control, feticide, battered babies, 
killing in war, .genetical engineering, organ transplants, 
test-tube babies, asexual human reproduction from human tis-
sue cultures, and the manipulation of the human mind and other 
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parts of the body by drugs. In other words, abortion is only 
one of several issues that raise questions about man*a 
theological justification for manipulating or destroying him-
self. It would be appropriate for theology to undertake 
study on these issues to that the conclusions reached on any 
one are consistent with those reached on the others; i.e. 
a theology of life under whose umbrella all of these issues 
might fit. 
APPENDIX 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FETAL HUMANITY AND ITS SANCTITY 
In traditional theology it was accepted that when one 
became a human one should be accorded the rights of humanity. 
In theological circles the discussion centred around the time 
at which this took place. Below is an outline of the principle 
factors in ancient times and the meaning that modern genetics 
brings to the picture. The outline is a digest of the des-
cription given by Paul Ramsey in his speech, "The Morality of 
Abortion" printed in the book Life or Death, by Daniel H. 
Lobby. 
Creationism:- This is the ancient theological be-
lief that the unique individual soul comes by process of 
humanization or socialization in interaction with persons 
around him. He is "created," "infused" into the already 
existing organism. Those who say that the child becomes 
human only after he is a personal object or exercises 
reasons, express the same idea (cf. Buss). 
Traducianism:- This is the opposite to Creationism. 
It is the belief that humanity takes place at conception. 
The individual is whoever he is going to be from the moment 
of conception, drawn forth from his parents. To explain 
identical twins, who are the result of a cleavage of the 
blastocyst, the cluster of cells formed from the original 
31 
32 
fertilized ovum, one has to compromise with creationism be-
cause the unique individuality obviously occurs at a time 
later than conception. 
Animation:- In the prenatal development "animation" 
is the point between conception and birth that is usually 
taken to be crucial. There are two answers: 1. The moment 
fetal life becomes an independent source of movement in the 
womb (it "quickens"); 2. the idea from the word anima (soul) 
that the soul is the form of the body. Thus fetus animatus == 
fetus humanus "= fetus formatus. This view entails the belief 
that a living human fetus exists much earlier than either dis-
cernible motion or discernible human shape. In theoretical 
speculation there has never been a certain or unanimous 
opinion among theologians to the effect that a fetus humanus 
or fetus animatus begins at the very moment of conception. 
There has always been a lapse assumed between conception and 
animation. 
Older theologians distinguished between a formed 
fetus and a quickened fetus, and nutritive,animal and intel-
lectual parts of the soul. But they did not go so far as to 
say that all this was created and infused at impregnation. 
Modern Genetics:- Modern genetics teaches that there 
are "formal causes," imminent principles, or constitutive 
elements long before there is any shape or motion or discern-
ible size. Now it can be asserted "scientifically" that who 
one is, and is to be, is present from the moment of conception. 
One may allow this does not necessarily imply that human 
rights should begin at conception. But one would have to 
provide himself with some account (perhaps drawn from these 
ancient accounts) of how by stages or degrees a human off-
spring approaches sacredness. 
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